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 Abstract:  
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 provided a variety of legal mechanisms for people to plan 
for periods of incapacity for decisions relating to personal care, medical treatment, and 
financial matters. Little research has however been done to determine the degree to 
which these are actually implemented, and the approach to such advance planning by 
service users and professionals. 
This paper looks at the use of advance planning by people with bipolar disorder, using 
qualitative and quantitative surveys both of people with bipolar disorder and psychia-
trists. The study finds that the mechanisms are under-used in this group, despite official 
policy in support of them, largely because of a lack of knowledge about them among 
service users, and there is considerable confusion among service users and professionals 
alike as to how the mechanisms operate. Recording is at best inconsistent, raising ques-
tions as to whether the mechanisms will be followed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
International human rights law increasingly expects the will and preferences of persons with mental 
disabilities to be pivotal in decision-making about them.  Article 12 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities enjoins States Parties to ‘recognize that persons with 
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.’ (United Nations, 
General Assembly, A/61/611, Art 12(2)).  The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability, the 
United Nations body charged with the implementation of the Convention, interprets this to mean 
that States Parties are to move away from systems where decisions are taken about people with 
disabilities without their involvement, to systems where the person with disability is supported to 
make decisions himself or herself.  In its General Comment about Article 12, the Committee states 
that for convention compliance, decisions must be based on the will and preferences of the person 
with disabilities rather than the objective best interests of that individual (United Nations Committee 
on the Right of Persons with Disabilities 2013, para 21).  The Committee considers the right to 
engage in advance planning to be part of this new legal framework: 
 
For many persons with disabilities, the ability to plan in advance is an important form of 
support, whereby they can state their will and preferences which should be followed at a 
time when they may not be in a position to communicate their wishes to others. All persons 
with disabilities have the right to engage in advance planning and should be given the 
opportunity to do so on an equal basis with others. States parties can provide various forms 
of advance planning mechanisms to accommodate various preferences, but all the options 
should be non-discriminatory. Support should be provided to a person, where desired, to 
complete an advance planning process. (United Nations Committee on the Right of Persons 
with Disabilities 2013, para 17) 
 
Systems of advance planning are therefore likely to become increasingly important in disability law.  
Introduction of such systems does not, of course, mean that they will be used, and the current 
empirical literature suggests that they are not.  Bond, summarising international studies, notes: 
 
Surveys of doctors and patients have shown consistently positive attitudes to all forms of 
anticipatory decisions in principle. However, they been found to have little impact on 
physician decision-making in practice. (Bond and Lowton, 2011, 451) 
 
The present study examines the use of advance planning mechanisms by people with bipolar 
disorder under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in England (hereinafter the ‘MCA’).  It explores both 
the ways in which the mechanisms are used, and, importantly, the experiences of service users and 
practitioners in the process of implementation.  As such, it examines not merely how the 
mechanisms are or are not being implemented, but also why. 
 
The MCA formalised, clarified, and extended the law in England and Wales relating to advance 
planning for people with capacity, envisaging times when they might lack capacity.  Powers of 
attorney for property and affairs, when expressly intended to do so, had since the Enduring Powers 
of Attorney Act 1985 been allowed to remain in effect following incapacity of the donor, and the 
MCA extended these provisions to include powers of attorney for personal decision-making.  
Statements of wishes, whether oral or written, were placed on a statutory footing, and are required 
to be considered when a decision is to be made on behalf of an individual lacking capacity.  Advance 
decisions to refuse treatment were similarly placed on a statutory footing, with formalities 
requirements introduced for treatment refusals that involved life-sustaining treatment.   
 
While they do not go as far as the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities would want, 
these were viewed as significant amendments at the time, adopting a new approach to mental 
disability and placing service users at the centre of the decision-making process.  While the benefits 
of that approach have recently been re-stated by a committee concerning the MCA of the House of 
Lords, (House of Lords 2014) little systematic empirical work exists as to how extensively these new 
mechanisms of advance planning have been implemented, and in particular little empirical work that 
takes into account the views of service users themselves.  The present paper concerns the use of 
advance planning under the MCA among people with bipolar disorder.  This is an additional 
departure from the existing literature.  Empirical studies concerning the implementation of lasting 
powers of attorney (hereinafter ‘LPOAs’) under the MCA, whether covering property and affairs or 
personal decision-making have focussed mainly on people with dementia or in care homes (Bond 
and Lowton, 2011; Manthorpe et al 2011; Samanta 2012;Samsi et al 2011; Samsi and Manthorpe 
2011a; Wilson et al, 2010).  Systematic study of advanced decisions to refuse treatment (‘ADRTs’) is 
limited to acute hospital care (Phair and Manthorpe 2012) and care of older people (Bond and 
Lowton 2011). 
 
Bipolar disorder provides a particularly relevant context for the study of advanced planning.  It is a 
cyclical condition affecting 1.4 per cent of the population (Merjkangas et al 2007; Merjkangasand 
Lamers 2012) and is characterised by periods of moderate to severe depression and separate 
periods of mania (elated mood, over activity, reckless behaviour, overspending, over-confidence). 
During these episodes, there is the potential for the person to cause lasting harm to themselves or 
others e.g. though overspending through impaired judgement as a result of the temporary change in 
mental state (Chamorro et al 2012).  If symptoms are severe enough, both the mania and depression 
phases of the condition may result in a loss of capacity to make at least some decisions.   In between 
episodes of illness, the vast majority of people with bipolar disorder return to their normal capacity. 
These experiences repeat over the course of the individual’s life.  Following onset, generally from 
the age of 13 to 30 years, an individual can expect ten recurrences of symptoms over the course of 
his or her life (Merjkangas et al, 2007; Macklin and Young 2005). Furthermore, each relapse into 
episodes of mania and depression tend to show the same early idiosyncratic pattern of symptoms 
and behaviour over a few weeks before full relapse occurs, (Jackson et al, 2003) potentially alerting 
the person, their carers and health professionals to the possibility of periods of time when the 
capacity may be temporarily lost.  
 
Advance decision-making is therefore particularly appropriate for people with bipolar disorder.   
While a person making planning in anticipation of dementia, for example, will have to speculate as 
to how he or she will feel at the time the decision is acted upon, after the first episode, a person 
with bipolar disorder making an advance decision will have direct experience of the condition and 
therefore what he or she will or will not want.  This is thus a paradigm case of the appropriateness of 
advance planning.  Consistent with this, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence has 
since 2006 advised clinicians to collaborate with patients in the development of advance decision-
making plans (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 2006, para 1.1.1.4), and this advice 
has been recently reaffirmed (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 2014). 
 
The present paper reports on a study of the use of advance decision-making among people with 
bipolar disorder.  It is based on a quantitative study of 549 people with bipolar disorder and 650 
psychiatrists, buttressed with qualitative interviews of fourteen service users and eight psychiatrists.  
The study was funded by the National Institute of Health Research (NIHR) as part of the PARADES 
(Psychoeducation, Anxiety, Relapse, Advance Decision Evaluation and Suicidality) study.   
 
II. ADVANCE DECISION-MAKING IN THE MCA:  THE LEGAL CONTEXT 
 
 
The advance planning elements of the MCA are of two forms.  The first allows a person with capacity 
to determine who will make decisions on his or her behalf during subsequent incapacity, and the 
second, within bounds, allows the individual to influence and in some cases determine how, 
substantively, decisions will be taken in the event of subsequent incapacity.   
 
The key mechanism for selecting who is to make decisions is the LPOA (MCA s 9-14).  These allow the 
donor to appoint any adult who is not bankrupt (a ‘donee’) to make decisions on his or her behalf, in 
the event that the donor loses capacity.  LPOAs are based on the model of Enduring Powers of 
Attorney (EPOA), introduced in 1985, but where EPOAs had been limited to property and affairs, the 
MCA opens them up to include personal care decisions.  Since the MCA came into effect, no new 
EPOAs can be created, but those created before the MCA came into effect are still valid.  In 2011-12, 
over 17,000 EPOAs were registered, so they are still certainly relevant.   
 
If an individual does not make an LPOA, the Court of Protection can make relevant decisions for that 
individual, and if necessary can appoint a ‘deputy’ to make decisions when an individual loses 
capacity.  This occurs most frequently when significant property and affairs decisions are to be 
made.  For personal care and treatment matters, the Court is generally reluctant to appoint a 
deputy, (see G v E and Manchester City Council [2010] EWHC 2512 (COP))  and decisions will usually 
be taken under a residual provision that creates a defence for people providing care or treatment in 
the best interests of people lacking capacity (MCA s 5-6).  In practice, this means that local authority 
employees and medical professionals are at the centre of decision-making for people lacking 
capacity without LPOAs.  In principle, they (like the Court, LPOAs and deputies) are to meant to 
consult with persons such as family members engaged in the care of the person lacking capacity as 
part of the determination of the individual’s best interests (MCA, s 4(7), but in practice it is 
questionable how extensive and effective such consultation is (Williams et al 2012, 93-4; House of 
Lords 2014, para 93-101) .  If a person wishes to determine who will make decisions, particularly in 
medical and personal welfare matters, the completion of LPOAs is therefore essential. 
 
The LPOA determines who makes decisions in the event of the donor’s incapacity; it does not 
determine how decisions will be made.  The donee must do nothing inconsistent with a valid and 
applicable decision to refuse treatment, but otherwise must still make decisions consistent with the 
best interests of the individual, as defined by the Act (s 4-6).   The best interests criteria do include 
subjective elements relevant to the donor’s wishes and feelings both when competent and when the 
decision is made, and also the donor’s beliefs and values – factors that the person selected as donee 
may well be well-acquainted with.  Nonetheless, if an individual wishes to influence how decisions 
are to be taken, not merely who will take them, additional advance planning is appropriate. 
 
This can take two forms.  The first, and most robust, is the advance decision to refuse treatment 
(ADRT) (MCA, s 24-26).  This allows an individual when competent prospectively to refuse treatment 
(generally understood to be medical treatment) during a subsequent period of incapacity, in 
conditions (if any) stipulated in the ADRT.  At the time the treatment would be given, the effect of 
the ADRT is the same as if the individual had capacity and refused the treatment.  Subject to 
comments below about treatment under the Mental Health Act 1983 (the ‘MHA’), the treatment 
cannot therefore be given.  If the ADRT is a refusal of life-sustaining treatment, it must be in writing 
and signed both by the donor and a witness, but otherwise there are no formality requirements for 
an ADRT.  That said, for evidential purposes, it is almost certainly desirable to put ADRTs in writing 
and insofar as possible, to notify relevant professionals of their existence before they are relied on. 
The implications of the ADRT can also be avoided if the donor has done anything clearly inconsistent 
with the ADRT after it has been made.   
 
ADRTs allow for the refusal of treatments; they do not allow for treatment to be demanded.  They 
are also restricted to ‘treatment’.  This is most obviously medical treatment, and while there may be 
some grey area around the term, it would certainly not apply, for example, to decisions regarding 
property and affairs.  To affect the way in which decisions are taken outside the parameters of 
ADRTs, the MCA allows for statements of wishes and feelings. 
 
Unlike ADRTs, statements of wishes influence but do not determine the outcome of decisions, but 
rather fall into the mix that constitutes determination of the incapable individual’s best interests.  As 
noted, absent an ADRT, whoever makes a decision for a person lacking capacity must make it 
according to the statutory definition of best interests:  there is no opt-out of the statutory criteria.  
The best interests criteria require the decision-maker to take account of ‘the person’s past and 
present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written statement made by him when 
he had capacity)’ along with the individual’s beliefs and values and any other factors the individual 
would be likely to consider if he were able to do so (s 4(6)(a)) – matters that can certainly be 
articulated in a statement of wishes – these are not the only relevant factors in the best interests 
assessment.  The MCA requires the decision-maker to take account of ‘all the relevant 
circumstances’ in assessing best interests, whether or not the individual would have prioritised those 
circumstances.  Recent jurisprudence from the Supreme Court has reinforced that best interests 
decision-making should ‘consider matters from the patient’s point of view’ (Aintree University 
Hospitals Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, para 85), presumably buttressing the 
significance of statements of wishes, but such statements nonetheless still merely influence 
decisions; they do not determine them.   
 
The MCA is not restrictive in the form that statements of wishes will take, although written 
statements made while the individual has capacity are stated to have particular relevance (s 4(6)(a)).  
That said, statements (whether oral or written) made after some reflection, or in some 
understanding that they will be relied upon, are likely to have more influence than statements made 
in a spirit of relative informality or frivolity.  That does not mean the latter are necessarily to be 
ignored; but it may affect the weight accorded to the statement. 
 
The MCA mechanisms do not create an independent right to services.  The right to services of a 
person lacking capacity, whether he or she has made an advance plan or not, is the same as any 
other service user – no more, no less. 
 
Of particular relevance in the case of bipolar disorder is the interaction between the MCA 
mechanisms and the MHA.  These arise in two ways.  First, people who lack capacity to make 
decisions regarding their admission to hospital can often be admitted if the statutory best interests 
test is met.  If the conditions of the MCA ‘deprivation of liberty safeguards’ (‘DOLS’) are met, they 
can be further detained there.2  The use of the DOLS is not permitted, however, when the proposed 
treatment is subject to an ADRT (MCA, sch A1, para 19). The legislation is ambiguous as to the effect 
of an advance plan other than an ADRT.  Certainly, if the present (ex hypothesi incapable) wishes of 
the patient are against admission to hospital for psychiatric treatment, the DOLS cannot be used 
(MCA, sch 1A, para 5(4)), but the degree to which prior wishes are to be taken into account is 
unclear.  The provision is phrased in the present tense, and states that ‘regard is to be had to 
circumstances from the past only so far as it is still appropriate to have regard to them’ (MCA, sch 
                                                          
2 Proposals for substantial amendment to the deprivation of liberty safeguards are currently under 
consideration by the Law Commission (Law Commission, 2015).  Proposals for reform from the Commission are 
expected at the end of 2016. 
1A, para 5(7)).  That suggests that where appropriate, regard should be had to circumstances from 
the past (including, presumably, wishes regarding admission and care), but only if ‘appropriate’, and 
there is no guidance as to what that word means in this context.  In any event, neither of these 
provisions restricts the use of the compulsory admission provisions of the MHA, where the criteria 
for such admissions are met. 
 
Second, part IV of the MHA allows treatment by medication for mental disorder (including bipolar 
disorder) if the patient is subject to detention under the Act.  For a period of three months following 
detention, the MHA provides that the patient may simply be treated without consent; after that 
period, the patient may be treated either on his or her competent consent, or with the certification 
of an authorised doctor (‘SOAD’) that ‘it is appropriate for the treatment to be given’ (MHA, s 58, 
63).  The decision of the SOAD is certainly judicially reviewable (see,eg., R (Wooder) v Feggetter 
[2002] EWCA Civ 554. The original decision of the responsible clinician presumably involves the 
exercise of a statutory power of decision, and would therefore be judicially reviewable (although this 
appears not to have been attempted in these terms).  If that decision engages rights under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, however, it is clearly judicially reviewable (see R (Wilkinson) 
v Responsible Medical Officer Broadmoor Hospital [2001] EWCA Civ 1545, and subsequent cases; 
discussed in Bartlett 2011).  No judicial review cases have overruled the decision of the treating 
physician on a decision to enforce treatment over a patient’s objection.  This suggests that, while 
none of that jurisprudence concerns advance planning, the prospect for legal enforceability of 
advance plans in this context may be minimal. 
 
That said, the relevant judicial review jurisprudence pre-dates the MHA Code of Practice, published 
in 2008.  The 2008 Code, unlike its predecessors, contained specific advice and detailed to clinicians 
as to how to approach wishes and decisions expressed in advance when the decision involves 
treatment within the scope of MHA compulsion.  The relevant elements were reiterated in the 
current Code of Practice, published in 2015.  The advice runs to an entire chapter of the Codes 
(Department of Health 2008, chapter 17, Department of Health 2015, chapter 9).  While the Code 
stops short of saying that an ADRT or previously expressed wishes must be followed, it does 
encourage clinicians to engage with patients in making such advance plans, and suggest that plans 
be given serious regard.  Thus regarding ADRTs, the current Code states: 
 
Even where clinicians may lawfully treat a patient compulsorily under the Act, they should, 
where practicable, try to comply with the patient’s wishes as expressed in an advance 
decision. They should, for example, consider whether it is possible to use a different form of 
treatment not refused by the advance decision. If it is not, they should explain why to the 
patient. (Department of Health, 2015, para 9.9) 
 
Regarding statements of wishes and feelings, the Code states: 
 
Encouraging patients to set out their wishes in advance will often be a helpful therapeutic 
tool, promoting collaboration and trust between patients and professionals. It is also a way 
in which effective use can be made of patients’ expertise in the management of crises in 
their own conditions. (Department of Health 2015, para 19.15; see also Department of 
Health 2008, para 17.14) 
 
At least since 2008, therefore, it has been good practice for clinicians to take the advance decision-
making seriously even for people detained under the MHA.  The legal effect of thes Code provisions 
is not yet clear.  The Code of Practice is not binding, (R (Munjaz)v. Mersey Care National Health 
Service Trust [2005] UKHL 58) but again since 2007, the MHA requires practitioners to ‘have regard’ 
to it (MHA, s 118(2D)).  This presumably means that it has some legal force. 
 
Two specific situations relating to treatment for mental disorder warrant particular note. 
 
The first concerns the provision of electro-convulsive therapy (ECT).  Amendments to the MHA in 
2007 now mean that an ADRT that prospectively refuses the provision of ECT, and the refusal of the 
donee of an LPOA to ECT, is enforceable, and cannot be overruled (MHA, s 58A(5)(c)).  This is 
relevant to people with bipolar disorder, since ECT is still an approved treatment in some 
circumstances for patients experiencing severely depressive symptoms (National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence 2006).  They can if they wish, through an ADRT, ensure that they do not 
receive ECT, except in emergency situations. 
 
The second concerns people subject to community treatment orders.  These introduce some 
coercive mechanisms into treatment programmes in the community, for some patients, following a 
release from MHA detention.  Treatment cannot be given to an individual lacking capacity under 
these orders if the provision of such treatment would conflict with either a valid and applicable 
ADRT or the refusal of a donee of an LPOA (MHA, s 64D(6)-(7)).  This does not provide as much 
protection as might appear, since a clinician can still recall the individual to hospital for enforcement 
of treatment in the order, either in the first three months following the initial detention giving rise to 
the community treatment order or if an independent doctor provided through a statutory scheme (a 
‘SOAD’) has permitted such a recall.  The protection is usually thus that the treatment cannot be 
given by force in the community, rather than in hospital. 
 
III. THE PRESENT STUDY 
 
1. Methodology and Participants 
 
The present study was designed to build a representative picture of the use, experience and 
understanding of advance planning under the MCA by adults with bipolar disorder, and the barriers 
and drivers to advance planning in this group.  For the quantitative element, 549 adults in England 
who had a (self-reported) diagnosis of bipolar disorder were recruited, in part through an online 
survey hosted at the University of Nottingham and promoted through service user organisations, 
and in part through substantively identical paper-based survey distributed and collected by the 
Mental Health Research Network.  Participation was restricted to English-speakers.  Participants 
were further required to complete the MDQ screening tool for bipolar disorder, (Hirschfeld et al 
2000) and those not meeting its criteria were excluded from the study.   
 
Advance planning under the MCA is not limited to planning in matters of medical treatment, but it 
was (correctly) anticipated that this would be a matter of significant concern to the service users.  
For this reason, and because psychiatrists were expected to have relevant insights into the barriers 
and drivers for take-up by service users, they too were surveyed, again with recruitment both 
through electronic means and through the Mental Health Research Network.  In all, 650 psychiatrists 
took part in the quantitative element of the study. 
 
The questionnaires were developed following interviews with five service users with bipolar 
disorder, four lawyers, two psychiatrists, a general practitioner, three social workers, and an MCA 
lead for a major mental health trust.  In addition, the project benefitted from the involvement of a 
service user advisory group based at the Spectrum Centre for Mental Health Research at the 
University of Lancaster and discussions among the key staff on the larger PARADES project. 
 
From among the respondents to the quantitative survey, 14 service users and 8 psychiatrists were 
selected for semi-structured interviews.  In addition to an indication of willingness to be interviewed 
in their responses to the quantitative questionnaire, the selection for involvement in the qualitative 
arm was based on geographic location, and, most significant, level of experience of advance 
planning.   
 
The age, race, education and employment status of the service user participants in the quantitative 
study are contained in tables 1 through 4.  Of the sample, 251 (45.7%) were married, civilly 
partnered, or living with a partner, while 213 (38.8%) were single and not partnered.   The age 
distribution and the rates of employment are broadly consistent with that found in Morgan et al’s 
2005 Australian epidemiological study of bipolar disorder, although the proportion of people 
married or civilly partnered appears somewhat in higher in the present sample. Insofar as the 
population of people with bipolar disorder mirrors the general population, the sample under-
represents people from BME communities (7.8% in the present study, as compared to 14.0 per cent 
in the 2011 national census (Office of National Statistics, 2012).3  
 
TABLE 1:  Age of service user participants 
 
 Frequency Percent  
 18-25 32 5.8  
26-34 74 13.5  
35-44 125 22.8  
45-54 168 30.6  
55-64 107 19.5  
65+ 38 6.9  
    
Missing  5 .9  
Total 549 100.0  
 
 
TABLE 2:  Ethnicity of service user participants 
 
 
 
 
White Mixed 
Asian/ Asian 
British 
Black/ Black 
British Chinese/ Other 
N  506 14 12 12 1 
Percent 92.2 2.6 2.2 2.2 0.2 
 
                                                          
3 Based on the 2011 census - http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-
authorities-in-england-and-wales/rpt-ethnicity.html, accessed 9/08/14. 
 
Table 3:  Highest education level reached by service user participants 
 
 Frequency Percent 
 GCSE 95 17.3 
A-Level 48 8.7 
N.V.Q 59 10.7 
College/ University 
Diploma 
109 19.9 
University Undergraduate 
Degree 
103 18.8 
University Postgraduate 
Degree 
53 9.7 
PhD 9 1.6 
None of the above 63 11.5 
Missing  10 1.8 
 
Total 
 
549 
 
100.0 
 
Table 4:  Employment status of service user participants 
 
 Frequency Percent 
 Employed (Full Time) 85 15.5 
Employed (Part Time) 69 12.6 
Employed (Voluntary) 21 3.8 
Self-employed 26 4.7 
Unemployed 90 16.4 
Sick/Disability 140 25.5 
Retired 79 14.4 
Student 18 3.3 
None of the above 10 1.8 
Missing  11 2.0 
Total 549 100.0 
 
 
Just over one third (199; 36.2%) of the service users had heard of the MCA prior to participating in 
the study.   
 
A majority of the 650 psychiatrist respondents were consultants, primarily in general adult 
psychiatry (283, 43.5%) or old age psychiatry (91, 14.0%).  There were 111 trainees who passed 
examinations in psychiatry set by the Royal College of Psychiatrists namely ST4-6 (17.1%), and 130 
more junior trainees working as psychiatrists CT1-3 (20%).  The breakdown of the years since 
qualification is contained as Table 5.  595 (91.5%) had been trained in the MCA, with table 6 showing 
that almost half of those attending at least three training sessions on the Act.  Perhaps tellingly, 
however, 61 per cent of those trained attended because the training was mandatory or as part of 
gaining approved clinician accreditation status (effectively a job requirement for psychiatrists); only 
13 per cent described themselves as attending for personal interest. 
Table 5:  Psychiatrist Respondents’ Years since Qualification 
 
 
Years since 
Qualification Frequency Percent 
 0 - 10 210 32.3 
11 - 20 241 37.1 
21 - 30 146 22.5 
30+ 51 7.8 
Total 648 99.7 
Missing  2 .3 
Total 650 100.0 
 
Table 6:  Number of Training Sessions attended by Psychiatrists 
 Frequency Percent 
 
 
1 128 19.7 
2 183 28.2 
3 113 17.4 
More than 3 
 
169 26.0 
Trained, but 
data missing 2 .3 
 Not trained 55 8.5 
Total 650 100.0 
 
2. Results 
a.  Low Usage 
The most striking initial finding of the quantitative element of the project is just how rarely advance 
planning is used, notwithstanding overall enthusiasm for the idea.  Thus of the 496 service users 
expressing an opinion, 408 (82.3%) thought it very important to be able to make plans about 
personal welfare, and an additional 61 (12.3%) thought it important.  Nonetheless, of the 549 service 
users in the survey, only 242 (44.1%) had engaged in any form of advance planning for incapacity 
covered by the survey.  Further, a considerable proportion of this was limited to informal 
conversations about property and affairs (151 or 28% respondents).  The more formal advance 
planning arrangements of the MCA are much less frequently used:  54 (9.8%) had made an advance 
decision to refuse treatment (but only 27 of those in writing), 28 (5.1%) an EPOA under the 1985 
legislation, 21 (3.8%) an LPOA for property and affairs, and 62 (11.3%) a statement of wishes and 
feelings.  Of the statements of wishes and feelings, 53 were in writing. 31 (5.6%) identified 
themselves as having made an LPOA for personal care, although the analysis below suggests that this 
may well be higher than is in fact the case.4 Of the total sample, only 130 people (23.7%) used one 
or more of these mechanisms.  The quantitative evidence from the psychiatrists survey is consistent 
with a low take-up rate.  Only 94 (14.5%) had encountered a patient with bipolar disorder who had 
made an ADRT; 136 (20.9%) had encountered a patient who had made an oral or written statement 
                                                          
4 See below, s III.2.e.  If this analysis is correct, then the number of LPOAs for property and affairs may be 
slightly higher than the raw statistics suggest. 
of wishes and feelings; and 91 (14.0%) had encountered a patient who had made an LPOA relating to 
health or personal welfare.  Each psychiatrist is likely to have treated a number of people with 
bipolar disorder; the relatively small numbers of psychiatrists who had encountered these 
mechanisms suggests they are indeed rarely used or perhaps that when used they are not coming to 
the attention of the psychiatrist.  This latter is a distinct possibility:  as will be discussed below, not 
all service users provided copies of their ADRTs to their psychiatrists, or indeed to other NHS 
contacts that would place them on the clinical file. 
No doubt, this low usage at least in part reflects a lack of knowledge of the MCA provisions (see also 
Samsi and Manthorpe 2011a regarding elder people).  Almost two thirds of the service users in the 
sample (63.4%) had not heard of the MCA prior to the study, and lack of knowledge was the most 
significant factor reported by service users in failing to make use of the specific mechanisms of 
advance planning.  For people failing to make an ADRT, 326 (65.4%) per cent gave this as the primary 
reason; for persons failing to make a statement of wishes, the figure was 385 (80.2%). 
This may, at least in part, reflect poor knowledge and implementation of the MCA more generally.  
Overall implementation of the MCA has recently been roundly criticised by an ad hoc committee of 
the House of Lords (House of Lords 2014).  It would be surprising for advance planning to be an 
exception to that overall failure, and a number of the issues identified by that Committee will arise 
as themes in the discussion that follows, including who has responsibility for implementation of the 
MCA, how the MCA integrates into professional practice, the need for systemic programmes of 
implementation, and the need for improved and appropriate information targeted at both 
professionals and service users. 
The nature of training received by psychiatrists may constitute part of the reason for this lack of 
knowledge among service users in this study, although the data are mixed on this point.  As noted in 
table 6, the vast bulk of psychiatrists in this study received training, often considerable training.  The 
training received tended to be viewed as of reasonably high calibre.  592 of the 595 (99.5%) 
psychiatrists trained provided a view on this point.  Of these, 580 (98.0%) rated the training as 
average or better in quality; 473 (75.3%) considered it good, very good, or excellent.  The training 
did not necessarily focus on advance planning, however:  only 230 (38.8%) stated that a reasonable 
or a significant amount of focus was given to advance planning; 333 (56.2%) reported minimal focus 
on advance planning; 30 (5.1%) reported none.  Nonetheless, when asked to identify which health 
profession was best informed of the advance planning provisions of the MCA, the psychiatrists 
identified themselves by a considerable margin – psychiatrists 336 (55.8% of 602 responses); social 
workers 206 (34.2%), GPs 26 (4.3%),  other physicians 18 (3.0%); nurses 16 (2.7%).  This suggests it 
may be simplistic to attribute the lack of information provided to service users to a lack of training of 
psychiatrists.  Consistent with that, while numbers are small, of 22 service users who reported 
consulting with their psychiatrist about a statement of wishes and who provided a view as to the 
calibre of that advice, 19 viewed the advice given as good or very good; and of 11 service users 
providing a view on advice received from psychiatrists regarding ADRTs, 7 considered the advice 
either good or very good.  While the nature of training may be relevant to the low rate of advance 
planning among people with bipolar disorder, it should not be understood as a complete 
explanation. 
b. Administrative and Professional Tensions 
The data disclose a set of interrelated tensions as to how advance planning fits within clinical 
structures, whose responsibility it is to investigate advance planning with service users, and the 
overall enthusiasm (or lack thereof) of professionals to engage with advance planning. 
The issues surrounding integration into clinical structures are of two sorts.  It would seem that Trusts 
have abundant policies relating to the MCA in general, and to advance planning in particular.  All of 
the psychiatrist interviewees who were asked about this affirmed the existence of Trust policies; 
none of them gave a coherent account of what they were, or how they worked.  This applied not 
merely to directive policies from the Trust, but also to the ways in which relevant documents are 
stored in clinical files:  none of the clinicians interviewed was able to identify how an advance plan, if 
one existed, would be located or flagged up in a clinical record.  At least as it is configured in some 
trusts, RIO, the electronic file system used in much of the NHS, does have a sub-file for MCA 
documents; but it does not appear that this is well-known or well-used.  Instead, MCA documents 
seem to be filed inconsistently, in other parts of the system.  In any event, the filing of a document in 
the MCA sub-file does not create a flag on the top sheet of the file alerting a clinician, so the system 
would seem to expect a search through the file on each occasion that information might be relevant.  
Trusts that use paper files create additional problems, as documentation may not be moved 
between files. 
None of this is likely to encourage clinicians to engage in processes of advance planning with service 
users.  Perhaps as a result, when attempts are made to implement policy, the results are not always 
satisfactory, as the following account from SU6 shows: 
 
SU6: Certainly Dr S presented me with a form for… I forget.. well, what you’re looking into. A 
form which asks about your desires for what you want to happen if you are not capable of 
looking after your own affairs.  
Interviewer: I see. And was this a pro-forma? Was it something that was standardised?  
SU6: Indeed it was. Published by… I think it was [name of Trust], rather than any other area, 
because I have another friend who’s bipolar, who had a different layout of the form, with 
the same questions.  
Interviewer: Right, I see. Forgive me for not phrasing this well. When your doctor gave you 
this form, what led to him actually doing this? What was the conversation beforehand if you 
like?  
SU6: I think it was… this is the gist… the government now require us [psychiatrists] to 
present to you this form… well, you don’t have to do it… if you wish to you can fill this form 
in. you can have one form yourself, or you can give a copy to a friend, GP, or we [the 
psychiatrist] can have one. I can show it to you if you like…  
* * *  
Interviewer: Right,. OK. Did you first raise this issue with your doctor? Did you come and say 
‘I’ve been reading about this and apparently there is a form which I can fill in…’ 
SU6: No. It was just that my psychiatrist handed me the form and said ‘look at this’.  
 
A very similar experience is related by SU2, where the form was provided by a support worker rather 
than a psychiatrist, and by SU1 whose psychiatrist was uncommunicative when a service user wished 
to develop a plan.  Whether because of lack of training, lack of time, or lack of enthusiasm, these are 
situations where the relevant policy has not been implemented in a fashion that encourages 
advance planning (or, certainly, not co-operative and high quality advance planning). 
A second sort of administrative complications arises when the MCA policies implicitly or explicitly 
linked or are in potential tension with other policies, which may have somewhat different objectives 
or foci.  This difficulty is not restricted to local implementation.  The government’s mental health 
strategy makes no reference to the MCA, notwithstanding that its stated ‘guiding values and 
principles’ require that ‘people with mental health problems are able to plan their own route to 
recovery’ supported by professional staff who ‘put them and their families and carers, at the centre 
of their care by listening to what they want, giving them information, involving them in planning and 
decision-making, treating them with dignity and respect, and enabling them to have choice and 
control over their lives and the services they receive’(DOH 2011,para 2.3; the previous strategy of 
the previous government similarly contains no reference to the MCA:  see DOH 2009).   Little if any 
thought appears to have been given to the relevance of the MCA in this process, and how the MCA 
provisions fit (or not) with the mental health strategy. 
The potential difficulties of this silence are reflected at the local level.  It would seem that 
frequently, as anticipated by the government strategy, planning is integrated with Recovery 
programmes.  Two of the interviewees in the qualitative study noted that their advance plans 
resulted from the implementation of Recovery programmes in their Trusts. A third drafted an 
advanced plan based on advice about Recovery from a textual source, rather than a programme 
provided through a Trust. ‘Recovery’ is in this context a term of art.  Recovery programmes 
encourage service users to articulate in their own terms, in consultation with clinical and social 
services staff, how they want to live their lives, what goals they wish to set for the treatment of their 
condition, and how those goals should be achieved (see Shepherd et al 2008).  While no doubt highly 
desirable, the ethos of this is not necessarily quite the same as for the MCA.  At the core of Recovery 
Programmes is the setting of therapeutic and related goals, and the construction of a therapeutic 
alliance between the patient and his or her clinical and social carers.  At its core is meant to be a 
process of ongoing reflection.  That is certainly related to, but not quite the same as the making of 
legally meaningful (and in the case of ADRTs, potentially legally binding) statements determining 
future care.  Where the ethos of Recovery is partnership, the ethos of advance planning under the 
MCA is service user empowerment – a related but not quite identical concept.  While the 
empowerment is rarely absolute for people with bipolar disorder – as discussed above decisions can 
generally be over-ruled through the compulsion provisions in the MHA – that does not alter the 
ethos of the Act. 
Whether for that reason, or because of the poor policy of implementation more generally, or 
because the legal technicalities of the MCA are complicated, it does seem that service users are not 
clear on the legal effects of what they are doing, as in the case of SU13: 
SU13: The only thing I’ve done is when I was working on my Recovery booklet. There was a 
section there about your requests if you had to be sectioned again. That was supposed to be 
scanned and added to your care plan, but that didn’t happen I don’t think. Then I had a new 
care coordinator since… probably the end of last year…. And we’ve gone through a new care 
plan, but again that isn’t anything to do with the MCA… it was a very informal… sort of my 
wishes were written down… I don’t think anybody would even find them on the system to 
be perfectly honest with you (laughs)! 
Interviewer: That’s really interesting. So just so I have it correct – this is a Recovery 
‘booklet’? 
SU13: Yes, it was one that was produced by  [xxx] Trust. They’re quite big on recovery and 
they have recovery packs that the care coordinator works through with clients. Part of that 
is, you know, write it down with us… when you’re high or low and then… it’s the whole thing 
really… you just write about your illness. 
There is no suggestion in this that the service user understands that this may well have legal 
significance in determining what treatment may or may not be provided.  Similarly SU 12 stated: 
Interviewer: Ah, I was going to ask about this – when you completed the advance directive, 
was there a template that you’d used or anything… 
SU12: Yes there was [provided through the Trust]. I used that, but just added in my own 
personal needs and what I wanted. Obviously it’s not a legal document and the doctors can 
override that as far as I am aware, but at least there’s a lot of information in there that could 
be quite useful to a new doctor. I think probably one of the reasons which prompted me to 
do it was because I was moving areas, I was losing the doctor I’d had for years. It was as if 
you’d been thrown out into the world, and no-one knows who you are. So it was a bit of 
reassurance for me really. 
Notwithstanding the view of the service user, it may well be a legal document; certainly it is a 
document with legal meaning in determination of best interests. Similarly, the qualitative data 
showed considerable confusion among service users as to the actual effects of the various MCA 
planning mechanisms.  There was considerable confusion for example in the distinction between a 
statement of wishes and feelings and an ADRT.  The failure of the service user to understand this is a 
matter of concern. 
If the status quo is problematic, it is fair to ask who should take responsibility to ensure that 
appropriate advance planning occurs.  If it is expected that for people with bipolar disorder this will 
happen through the mental health system (either through clinicians or social services staff based in 
health environments), it is unsurprising that the MCA provisions will be reinterpreted through a 
therapeutic or clinical lens:  that does after all reflect clinicians’ training and professional culture.  At 
the same time, the implied focus on therapeutic matters leaves other aspects of advance planning 
outside consideration.  Few service users in the survey were aware of LPAs for property and affairs, 
for example, even though the financial problems that can result from behaviour of people with 
bipolar disorder when in a manic state are well known.  These can be articulated in therapeutic 
terms – the incursion of massive debts can contribute significantly to depression – but as with ADRTs 
and statements of wishes relating to health care, the lack of knowledge suggests that psychiatrists 
do not see themselves as having a role proactively to draw these to the attention of service users.    
The empowerment ethos of the MCA provisions can also come into perceived conflict with the 
clinical role.  One administrator and former clinician commented in the pilot interviews for the 
design of this study: 
There is a difficulty when talking about advance decisions and patients with mental disorder, 
you can see where the Trust might have a bit of a conflict of interests perhaps. If you’re 
thinking about patients with a mental disorder making advance decisions to refuse 
treatment, and yet when the core business of the Trust is to treat mental disorder, you can 
see where there might be a certain amount of conflict of interest. Now I’m not saying that 
there shouldn’t be any advice given at all, but I can see why the Trust might be a little bit 
careful about advice they may give about decisions to refuse treatment, whereas I can see 
why they might be happier to talk about statements of wishes and feelings – non-binding, 
persuasive, have to be taken into account, and of course the trust does look into that in 
terms of recovery. Refusal of treatment I think is perhaps a little bit different. 
Perhaps consistent with this, of the 186 psychiatrists who stated they had experience of people with 
bipolar disorder making oral ADRTs, 125 (67.2%) stated they made a record of the decision and 74 
(39.7%) said they provided an ADRT form for the service user to complete, but 36 (19.3%) said they 
did neither of these, presumably not seeing it as appropriate to ensure that the decision was 
recorded. 
Other clinicians were doubtful as to the reality of the conflict, but did not dispute that there was a 
perceived tension among some colleagues between advanced planning, and particular ADRTs, and 
the best therapeutic care.  In the view of one of the psychiatrist interviewees, this resulted in a focus 
away from core issues of treatment and consent, towards less controversial matters: 
But in general, most advance directives I see are done with care coordinators – I think they 
are encouraged to do them with patients – they’re biased towards things like ‘who’s going to 
look after the dog’. You know, the format they use has those kind of things – ‘who can know 
about the condition’. I think we’re probably not doing enough with people on discussing 
what their wishes are about treatment in certain scenarios. 
Interestingly, none of the psychiatrists interviewed as part of the qualitative study mentioned the 
provisions in the MHA Code of Practice that encourage clinicians to engage with service users in the 
development of plans for future care, and while interviewees tended to view the MCA provisions as 
a very positive innovation in mental health services, they also acknowledged that discussions 
regarding advance planning were not occurring as frequently as they might.  The quantitative survey 
asked psychiatrists what would increase the amount of time they spent discussing ADRTs with 
patients, and the results are in table 7.  That suggests that it is not time or information that is the key 
barrier, but whether the service user presses the issue.  Along with the qualitative material noted 
above, this reinforces the image of the psychiatrist as passive on advance planning issues (and 
ADRTs in particular) – content perhaps to discuss the issues raised by service users, but not generally 
viewing themselves as the instigators of the process.  As an implementation strategy for MCA 
advance planning, this is of course problematic.  The evidence from the present study and elsewhere 
is that service users do not routinely find out about their options under the MCA from other sources; 
and if they do not know, it cannot be assumed that they will ask. 
 
Table 7:  I [Psychiatrist] would discuss ADRTs more if…  
 
 Number  Percent 
[n=650] 
There was more time 227 34.9 
There was more information on the subject 245 37.7 
The patient had requested this 457 70.3 
A Care Co-Ordinator/Carer requested this 294 45.2 
[Other reasons] 115 17.7 
 
 
c. Factors related to Service Users 
While there are thus systematic impediments to the full implementation of the MCA provisions 
regarding advanced planning, the data also suggest that the enthusiasm of service users to engage 
with planning processes should not be read simplistically.  Certainly, the service users interviewed 
for the qualitative element of this project were generally extremely enthusiastic about the 
possibilities afforded by the MCA, and lack of knowledge was identified as a major factor in failure to 
engage with those possibilities, but for all their enthusiasm, not all had taken advantage of the 
mechanisms which might well have been relevant to them even when they did know about them.  
The case of SU12 provides an example: 
I do know about Powers of Attorney. We should all have one. I’ve got a will and every year, 
the people who made our will whom we store it with put a little note about powers of 
attorney. […] So I am aware of it but haven’t got one. 
That service user provided no particularly clear reason as to the decision not to make an LPA, but 
other data does provide some indication.   
Sometimes, it is fairly clear that the administrative complexity of advance planning is a barrier.  The 
qualitative data suggests that this in part flows from the lack of support provided by professional 
staff noted above, but it is also that the forms themselves can be complex.  LPOAs are notorious in 
this regard,(see House of Lords 2014 para 182).  The data from the quantitative survey suggest that 
service users want help and advice in how to complete ADRTs, LPAs and statements of wishes, but 
do not know who to ask or are unsure how to fill in the relevant documents.  While there are 
occasional comments in qualitative and quantitative data to suggest a desire not to be seen to 
disagree with one’s doctor, it also needs to be noted that a significant deterrent to completion of an 
LPOA is a feeling of intimidation by involvement with lawyers. 
Sometimes, reluctance would appear to flow from a desire not to foreclose treatment options.  Of 
the 96 service user respondents who had heard of statements of wishes and feelings but not made 
one, exactly half stated that there was no treatment about which they had sufficiently strong views 
that they would wish to make a statement.   For SU10 and SU7, the failure to make an advance plan 
would appear to be the result of a good relationship with the treatment team: 
SU10:  Well, psychiatrists are very good at listening to you and trying out things that will 
both work and be acceptable to you. I’ve never had any problem with feeling that 
medication has been imposed on me. I’ve been occasionally, not with my current 
psychiatrist, but occasionally been under pressure to take a certain type of medication that I 
didn’t want, like Lithium – but I’ve never felt like I didn’t have any choice in the matter. 
Consistent with this, 63 of the 171 respondents (36.8 %) who were aware of ADRTs but had not 
made one, did so on the basis that ‘I am confident that my doctor will make the right decisions for 
me.’   
While one can only be pleased at such successful clinical relationships, a note of warning is 
appropriate.  As noted above, the data suggests that service users are not always correct in their 
understanding of the effects of the advance planning mechanisms.  In particular, the qualitative data 
in the present study suggests that some service users believe that family members have a residual 
right to make decisions on behalf of adults lacking capacity, in both personal and at least some 
financial matters.  Absent an LPOA or a court order, this is simply not correct.  It is perhaps 
appropriate to keep some critical eye on the view that advance planning is not done because it is not 
thought to be required. 
It is worth noting that the process of advance planning can itself have problems associated with it, 
albeit sometimes with related benefits: 
Interviewer: Right. And how did you find the process of completing the document? 
SU13: Quite difficult. I mean, it’s quite upsetting to remember times when you were in a 
state that you had to be sectioned or go into hospital. I mean, it did bring up quite a few 
memories that weren’t so great. There was quite a lot of planning when I was pregnant 
because there was a one in two to one in four chance of me going high after the birth of my 
son, so we had planning meetings for two weeks where my wishes were known about – 
what mum and baby unit I’d want to be admitted into in London. That was quite upsetting.  
Interviewer: Yes, I can imagine that the process of filling in that sort of information would 
trigger a lot of memories. Did you find it a worthwhile thing to do overall? Did you have any 
feelings that you were more in control or empowered.  
SU13: It did make me realise how much better I am now than I have been previously. Within 
the last four or five years, I’ve had minor ups and downs, but nothing compared to how I 
was before. 
Consistent with this, a respondent to in the quantitative survey responded when asked why an ADRT 
was not made with a discursive comment, ‘cannot face doing it’.  While SU13 saw benefits as well as 
detriments to the experience of revisiting her illness, the experience of different individuals may be 
different.  How far it is appropriate to encourage service users to revisit their past in this way is an 
ethical question, contingent on the individual service user and situation; but it is appropriate to note 
that there may be emotional costs attached, a matter to be considered by anyone offering advice in 
this area. 
Finally, a fairly small number of service users said that they had not made an ADRT because it could 
be overridden in any event if they were sectioned under the MHA.  That concern would apply 
equally to other forms of advance planning relating to detention or treatment for mental illness. 
The data suggests that service users are in general enthusiastic about advance planning.  It would 
also appear that they find the process of making advance plans administratively complicated, that it 
is not clear to them that the advance plans will be readily located by clinicians when they are 
required, that they may be overruled anyway, and that there may be emotional costs to revisiting 
the period of illness.  Many of these views are consistent with those provided in the psychiatrists’ 
data.  It is perhaps therefore unsurprising that some service users take the view that the benefits are 
not worth the effort, even if they are aware of the options available to them (which most are not). 
One of the findings from the above data is that the differences between the various advance 
planning mechanisms is not well understood, either by service users or psychiatrists.  The data 
nonetheless also provide some interesting insights into the use of the specific planning mechanisms 
under the MCA.  The paper now turns to that analysis. 
d. ADRTs 
As noted above, 54 (9.8%) of the service users in the quantitative study had made ADRTs, of which 
50 indicated where they had first heard of them.  Unsurprisingly given the data described above, 
only one in five of these found out about the ADRT from a psychiatrist, and one in ten from a care 
co-ordinator.  Indeed, the largest source of information was contained within ‘other, please specify’, 
where service users typed in ‘myself’ (n=12, plus 2 who knew about ADRTs from employment 
unrelated to their treatment and an additional 4 who found out through their own research, for 
example on the internet or in the library).  The other sources of initial information are vanishingly 
small.  Consistent with the comments above, there appears to be no consistent or systematic way in 
which people are to be notified of ADRTs. 
 
Table 8:  Treatments Refused in ADRTs (n=29) 
 
All medication 0 (0%) 
A particular brand of medication 15 (51.7%) 
Electro-Convulsive Therapy (ECT) 9 (31.0%) 
Depot Injections 4 (13.8%) 
A particular type of medication (eg., anti-
depressants) 
12 (41.3%) 
Not stated 2 (6.7%) 
 
27 of the ADRTs were in writing.  Table 8 indicates what treatment was refused.  While the numbers 
are small, it is notable that no one refused all medication.  It would appear instead that most of the 
refusals refer to fairly specific medications or types of medication.  This seems consistent with the 
experience of the psychiatrists interviewed, suggesting that there may be considerable potential 
common ground between service user and clinician, or at least that reasonable compromise by the 
clinician may allow a good standard of care to continue.  The fears of full-scale conflict of interest, 
noted above, may overstate the actual tensions likely to arise.   Nonetheless, there was no 
suggestion from the psychiatrists that the enforceability of ADRTs should be extended.  Instead, the 
view of psychiatrists was that the MHA override provisions should be retained for situations of real 
necessity, as in the following comment: 
Psychiatrist:  She’d made an advance directive which was not very official looking, but was 
probably OK. I don’t think they need to be quite officially. Something written, signed and 
dated is OK. They don’t need to be with solicitors and things. Essentially, she pretty much 
scribbled it when she became unwell. Unfortunately it was quite an unrealistic one – it 
hadn’t been discussed properly with her because she was becoming unwell. It pretty much 
said no medication except carbamazepine. The difficulty was, to be fair to my colleague who 
was managing her, she [patient] was there on a section 3 on the ward, and clearly what he 
[colleague] had tried to do, and his way of negotiating this, was he said ‘OK I’ll TRY and 
manage you on carbamazepine first. But you are pretty unwell and I’m not sure that’ll be 
very effective. Sure enough, two weeks on and she was no better. He said ‘Sorry but I’m 
going to have to move your treatment on and give you medication that you don’t want. 
You’re under a section 3 and I have to get on and do that.’ That was when he has to 
introduce something else. I think she was on a depot in the end because she wouldn’t even 
swallow the tablets.  
 
Interviewer: It’s fascinating. I’m not a clinician so I always imagined that in those sorts of 
scenarios, rather than being in the context of not wanting any medication other than this, I 
expected that it‘d be ‘I don’t mind other medications APART from this.’  
 
Psychiatrist: That’s right. That is what other cases I’ve been involved with say. They just 
exclude one or two treatments. They consult me in the CPA and ask if that was reasonable. 
This lady had gone off and done it whilst becoming unwell and off her own back. It just 
didn’t make sense really. I felt for my colleague because on the one hand, he wanted to keep 
a relationship with the patient. 
This quote raises not merely the question of the scope of ADRTs, but also their enforceability.  There 
is no formal requirement in the MCA that an ADRT be discussed with anyone prior to it taking effect 
nor that it be in writing unless it is a refusal of life-sustaining treatment.  At the same time, when the 
psychiatrist can often overrule the ADRT by the compulsory powers under the MHA, it seems 
strategically wise to make the ADRT in writing and discuss it with the psychiatrist or allied 
professional.  In this study, almost half of the ADRTs were not in writing.  Of service users who did 
make their ADRTs in writing, only 17 (62.9%) discussed their ADHT with a psychiatrist, and 17 with a 
Care Co-Ordinator.  Service users making 13 of the 17 ADRTs consulted neither of these people, 
leaving some doubt as to how their refusals will be dealt with, whatever the law says. 
People making ADRTs did, generally, seek out advice.  The quantitative survey asked about 
consulting care coordinators, psychiatrists, lawyers, service user groups within and outside the NHS, 
family members, friends, text-based materials and other sources.  Only two of the 27 service users 
consulted none of these.  Of the six people consulting only one of these, four considered the advice 
received to be good or very good.  Of the remaining 19 people who consulted at least two of these, 
all but one received at least one set of advice that was viewed as good or very good.  Consistent 
again with the view that the problems are not just about training, it does seem that good advice is to 
be had, if the service user is prepared to look for it. 
Table 9 describes the places written ADRTs are lodged for safekeeping.  A problem with the data 
arose in this question.  12 of the 29 people indicating that ‘I just keep a copy for myself’, but 11 of 
these went on to identify others with whom the document was kept.  This presumably means that 
these respondents read the response as ‘I kept a copy for myself’ – although this is not a good 
measure for the numbers of respondents keeping a copy of their ADRT, since the other respondents 
presumably did not read the question in that way.    It does not follow from this, however, that NHS 
staff were routinely informed of the ADRTs.  Of the 29 responses, 8 did not provide a copy of the 
ADRT to their psychiatrist, care co-ordinator, or had it placed in their notes, (although one of these 
provided a copy to his or her GP).  This is a questionable strategy, as it is not obvious how the 
professional will be made aware of the ADRT, in the event that it is needed.  That said, the 
qualitative data from the psychiatrists and, to a lesser degree, from the service users suggests that 
placement of the ADRT on the clinical file may also be of doubtful efficacy, since as noted above 
there is generally nothing on the top page of the file to alert the clinician to the existence of the 
ADRT within the file.  It seems therefore a good strategy in addition to give a copy to a friend or 
family carer; but only 14 of the service users had done this. 
Table 9:  Places where ADRTs and Statements of Wishes Kept 
 
 Written ADRTs (n=29) Written Statements of Wishes 
(n=53) 
Self alone 12[5] 0 
Care Co-Ordinator 5 17 
General Practitioner 10 15 
Psychiatrist 12 17 
Lawyer 2 3 
Carer 2 7 
NHS Notes  12 13 
NHS Service User Group 0 0 
Non-NHS Service User Group 1 3 
Family Member 12 15 
Friend 3 6 
Other 5 13 
Not stated 2  
 
e. LPOAs 
The raw statistics on LPOAs from the quantitative study of service users would suggest that 31 
(5.7%) made an LPOA for personal welfare, 28 (5.1%)  an EPOA under the 1985 legislation, and 21 
(3.8%) an LPOA for property and affairs.  Those making LPOAs for personal welfare were however 
invited to write in the primary reason for doing so, and 27 did so.  The reasons provided make it 
clear that there is no understanding of the difference between powers of attorney for personal 
welfare, and those for property and affairs:  in 10 of these cases, the motivation for making the 
document was stated unambiguously to be for financial matters, rather than personal matters, 
notwithstanding the introduction to the question stating that ‘an LPA for Personal Welfare allows 
you to appoint a person of your choice to make decisions on your behalf in matters relating to your 
health and welfare.’   It is at best doubtful that these people in fact made LPOAs for personal 
welfare, rather than for property and affairs.  In that event, the number of LPOAs for personal 
welfare would reduce to 21 (3.8%).  Taking into account the number of those people who also said 
they had made property and affairs powers of attorney, the total number of EPOA/property LPOAs 
would rise to 53 (9.7%).   
Certainly some of the motivations listed for the personal welfare LPOAs is entirely consistent with 
what the MCA might be taken to envisage: ‘I trust my attorney will make right decisions for me. 
Knows me well’; ‘I feel that there are periods when I am not capable of making decisions and I need 
                                                          
5 This is almost certainly an unreliable number:  see discussion in text. 
other people to step in at these times.’.  Other reasons again make it clear that there is considerable 
lack of understanding about LPOAs for personal care.  Thus one respondent comments that ‘I was 
grateful for the opportunity to register my long-held request for palliative intervention only.’  While 
it may be the case that a donee of an LPOA for personal welfare may be particularly sympathetic to 
the views of the donor, the LPOA itself merely designates a decision-maker; the decision is still taken 
under the general best interests test of the MCA.  If the individual wished to preclude other than 
palliative treatment, the appropriate mechanism is an ADRT. 
By comparison, the motivations for LPOAs for property and affairs and EPOA do not seem to suggest 
motives relating to personal welfare.  They are instead related to financial transactions such as the 
need to pay rent or control spending.   
The qualitative data for LPOAs, both for property and affairs and for personal care decisions, does 
suggest that those not making them may be under misapprehensions as to the ability of family 
members and similar carers to make decisions absent the LPOA: 
SU13: well I would want my partner to take over my account to pay my bills, but I’ve got 
nothing… if I was in hospital, I’ve got no power of attorney or anything formally documented 
with the banks specifying who should take over my account. It’s all rather informal. 
The difficulty is, of course, that absent the LPOA, the partner has no formal authority to make the 
relevant decision. 
 
f. Statements of Wishes and Feelings 
As noted above, statements of wishes and feelings are a rather more amorphous mechanism of 
advance planning.  While written statements made when competent have a particularly high status 
under the MCA, oral statements and statements of incapacitous wishes and feelings are also to be 
taken into account in determination of the individual’s best interests.  As noted above, these may 
therefore merge into other information-gathering systems, such as Recovery programmes, that may 
or may not precisely coincide with the ethos of advance planning under the MCA.  Thus while 62 
service users in the quantitative survey (11.5%) stated that they had made statements of wishes and 
feelings relating to personal care, it may well be the case (and it is to be hoped that it is the case) 
that considerably more have discussed their care and treatment with their medical and social care 
advisors:  this is, after all a key element of good care.  The service users may well not have 
understood that the discussion could have legal meaning, but that is a slightly different issue.  
Presumably, they would have wanted their wishes taken into consideration in decisions related to 
future treatment, and that is what is envisaged by the MCA. 
Of the statements, 53 were in writing, and the place in which they are lodged is detailed in Table 9, 
above.  17 of the 53 respondents did not provide a copy to their psychiatrist, care co-ordinator, or 
placed a copy in their NHS notes (although of these, 4 provided copies to their GP and 1 to a CPN).  
Where the ADRT of course refers only to medical treatment, 33 of the written statements concerned 
matters extending into the broader social or domestic sphere, making it less obvious that disclosure 
to medical staff was necessary. 
The subjects covered in statements of wishes and feelings for personal care and treatment are 
contained in Table 10.  Of those identifying themselves as making such statements relating to 
personal care and treatment, however, 51 included provisions either favouring or expressing 
reservations about medical treatment or identifying people who should or should not be contacted 
in the event of illness or which 44 were in writing.  Here, too, not all provided copies to the 
treatment team:  16 provided a copy to their psychiatrist; an additional 16 people give a copy to care 
co-ordinator or stated that a copy had been placed in their NHS notes, one more had given a copy to 
his or her GPs and one to a CPN.  Thus 8 had not lodged it with an NHS source.  While numbers are 
small, this also applies to oral statements of wishes, of which there were 7: only one had been 
communicated to the psychiatrist, and an additional one to the GP.  This does seem a matter of 
concern:  it seems likely that oral wishes regarding treatment issues will carry considerably more 
weight if discussed with the relevant clinician directly. 
 
Table 10:  Subjects of Statements of Wishes and Feelings (n=62) 
 
in favour of a particular medical treatment 30 (48.3%) 
against a particular medical treatment 32 (51.6%) 
Wishes regarding accommodation 19 (30.1%) 
Whom to be notified in the event of illness 38 (61.3%) 
Whom not to be notified in the event of illness 17 (27.4%) 
childcare 6 (9.7%) 
Dependant care 4 (6.5%) 
Pet care 15 (24.2%) 
General domestic affairs 23 (37.1%) 
Other 15 (24.2%) 
 
The patterns surrounding statements of wishes in property and affairs matters are different.  
151(27.5%) of the service users indicated that they had made such statements, either orally or in 
writing – by far the highest participation rate for advance planning mechanisms in the survey, and 
two thirds of these people indicated that the statement was made to family members.  Again, this is 
a perplexing statistic.  It is unsurprising that people with bipolar disorder discuss financial matters 
with their families; but is it really the case that they do so to such a greater degree than matters of 
personal care and treatment?  It seems much more likely that statements of wishes regarding 
property and affairs in the survey were not recognised as parallel questions to those concerning 
statements regarding personal care.  That again reinforces that the legal mechanisms are not well-
understood. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF PLANNING UNDER THE MCA, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
IMPROVED IMPLEMENTAITON 
The obvious remaining question is whether all the MCA amendments that provide new and clarified 
opportunities for advance planning make any difference.  As noted in the introduction to this paper, 
treatments for mental disorder, unlike treatments for other disorders, can be provided under 
compulsion if the relevant requirements of the MHA are met.   It is clear from the qualitative 
interviews and the discursive entries on the quantitative surveys that the MHA power to ‘trump’ is 
well-known by service users and clinicians alike.  In principle, decisions by clinicians to treat 
involuntarily can be subject to judicial review, but there is as yet no case where a doctor’s decision 
to provide such treatment has been overturned by the courts.  In terms of the formal legal process, 
advance planning under the MCA appears to be rather a paper tiger. 
What happens in court, of course, does not necessarily reflect what happens in the consulting room.  
Here, the evidence from the survey is mixed and inconclusive.  As noted above, the usage rates are 
generally poor, and it would seem from the psychiatrists’ data, not improving.  Of the 259 
psychiatrists expressing an opinion, 208 (80.3%) considered that the number of people with bipolar 
disorder making ADRTs had remained the same since the implementation of the MCA in 2007, and 
41 (15.8%) considered that it had increased by less than 10 per cent.  Of the 252 psychiatrists 
expressing a view regarding statements of wishes and feelings by people with bipolar disorder, 187 
(74.2%) thought that frequency remained the same since the MCA came into force, and 46 (18.3%) 
that it had increased by less than 10 per cent.  These are not encouraging numbers.   
Certainly, there is evidence in the data of some very good practice among clinicians (as well, of 
course, of some considerably less good practice).  It is difficult to isolate however how far the good 
practice identified is directly related to the advance planning provisions of the MCA.  Thus a number 
of the service user interviewees speak of how good their doctor is at listening to them.  This is of 
course good; but it is not clear how it relates to the MCA specifically.  Psychiatrists gave examples of 
where they had made real attempts to comply with advance plans; but often were unsuccessful and 
reverted to compulsion under the MHA.  There are jurisdictions where ADRTs in mental health care 
are enforceable and cannot be overruled (See, eg., Ontario Health Care Consent Act, SO 1996, c 2, 
Sch A, s 42).  It is perhaps notable that not even the most enthusiastic of the psychiatrist 
interviewees proposed a similar system here.  For those that knew of patients with bipolar who had 
ADRTs and were sectioned, more than a third of psychiatrists said that the detentions were 
motivated at least to some extent by the need to override the ADRT.  Again, this is an ambiguous 
statistic:  65% of the psychiatrists said that the ADRT was not a factor in the detention.  Nonetheless, 
it is clear that there is a limit in clinical practice to the scope of advance planning permitted. 
If advance planning under the MCA is to be successful however among people with bipolar disorder 
(and, quite possibly, other conditions within the scope of the MHA), there must be some evident 
benefit to the service user.  Even within the scope of the existing compulsion provisions of the MHA, 
that may well be possible, if it becomes clear to service users that the ADRTs, LPOAs and statements 
of wishes are taken seriously by clinical and care staff.  It is not clear from the data in the present 
study how much that is happening. 
While this study is, as far as we are aware, the largest empirical study of advance decision-making 
yet conducted regarding the MCA, it is not of course definitive.  While the quantitative elements of 
the study are composed of reasonable sample sizes, they are to a considerable degree independent 
samples:  the service users sampled were not necessarily the patients of the psychiatrists sampled.  
Even with the large numbers in the initial samples, the numbers engaged in advance planning 
directly was small.  While that is itself a highly important finding – the MCA advance planning 
mechanisms are not being used to any great extent by people with bipolar disorder – it does mean 
that the quantitative inferences relating to the individual planning mechanisms is based on relatively 
small sample sizes, and it is much less obvious that these conclusions can simply be generalized 
uncritically.  In the extreme, only two of the service users who had made ADRTs had been subject to 
MHA admission afterwards.  That is, of course, an insufficient number to produce relevant 
quantitative findings.  The limitations of the statistical data are addressed in part through the use of 
the qualitative data:  the quantitative conclusions received support through the interviews.   
The value of the quantitative evidence will also be contingent on the representativeness of the 
samples.  If service users with bipolar match the general population – a matter not entirely free from 
doubt – the sample in this study was somewhat overeducated, and BME people were under-
represented.  It is not obvious how the racial disparity would affect the results.  The educational 
disparity might perhaps suggest that the situation is in fact more extreme on key findings than the 
statistics would suggest.  It is hard to believe that more highly educated people are less informed 
about their rights than the general population, and hard to believe they are less willing to press for 
those rights and engage with service providers in ensuring that those rights are respected.  If the 
problems are a lack of knowledge and limited engagement with professionals, it is hard to believe a 
sample with fewer educated people would result in findings of greater usage of the MCA or greater 
engagement with professionals about advance planning. 
The result remains problematic, however.  The study remains essentially a study of service users and 
psychiatrists.  Apart from the initial interviews upon which the survey was developed, no social care 
professionals, other health professionals, legal professionals or non-professional carers were 
surveyed or interviewed.  One might reasonably expect such groups to have a rather different 
perspective on the MCA.  As a clear example to make the point, as noted above, only 2.7% of 
psychiatrists thought nurses were the best informed health profession on advance planning and the 
MCA.  One might reasonably expect that if nurses were surveyed, they might well have a different 
view.  While that is a particularly clear example, the issue of perspective is pervasive:  this is a study 
of psychiatrists and service users. 
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